Introduction
The U.S. current account deficit was a record $668 billion in 2004, accounting for 5.7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and fully twothirds of global net foreign lending. Its size, as well as the unprecedented foreign flows into U.S. bonds associated with it, have raised concerns about how the adjustment to a more balanced current account will play out. One grim scenario begins with foreigners suddenly losing their appetite for U.S. assets, and, in the process of unwinding their large U.S. positions, pushing up interest rates, depressing growth and causing a large depreciation of the dollar. Worries about such a disorderly adjustment first surfaced in 2000, when the U.S. deficit-GDP ratio crossed the 4 percent mark.
The conventional wisdom on current account adjustment is that some current account deficits are more problematic than others. Important factors are the size and persistence of the deficit, its use and financing, and the openness and indebtedness of the economy. For example, Summers (2004) notes that 5 percent of GDP is a traditional danger point for current account deficits and argues that deficits rising to finance consumption and government spending and deficits supported by short-term financing are
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of relatively greater concern. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004) highlight the importance of goods-market integration in adjustment because the magnitude of exchange rate adjustment needed to reduce a deficit is greater when markets are not well integrated and the substitution between foreign and domestic goods is low. Roubini and Setser (2005) worry about the size of the foreign debt position and the corresponding interest payments. Concerns about delaying a U.S. adjustment abound, for example, Bergsten and Williamson (2004, 24) write " [n] o one doubts that adjustment will eventually happen. The sooner it starts, the less chance it will take a catastrophic form. " We aim to evaluate the importance of these concerns by examining the U.S. situation within the context of current account reversals that have occurred in a wide range of industrial countries. In all, we have at our disposal twenty-six current account reversals that occurred between 1980 and 2003. The twenty-six episodes vary in a number of ways and allow us to place the current U.S. situation in context; while the United States may be in what it considers uncharted waters (with respect to its own history), along many dimensions its current scenario is not atypical.
There are well-known characteristics of current account reversals in industrial countries. In particular, they tend to occur around 5 percent of GDP and involve currency depreciation and a decrease in GDP growth (Freund 2000 (Freund , 2005 .
1 But typical can conceal considerable deviations across episodes as some reversals are more benign than others. The main goal of this paper is to examine the extent to which aspects of the buildup of the current account deficit are associated with more severe outcomes; we attempt to uncover the set of preconditions that is associated with more benign outcomes and the set that is associated with greater pain. Specifically, we examine-in the context of twenty-six current account reversals-the extent to which variation in the size and persistence of the current account deficit, its nature (whether it is funding consumption or something more productive, such as investment), the size and composition of financing, and the openness of the economy matter for the adjustment process. We then characterize the adjustment process using three main measures: the extent of exchange rate depreciation, the slowdown in GDP growth, and the improvement in the current account balance that accompany reversals.
We begin by updating the characterization of current account reversals. To do this, we append the Freund (2000) analysis with a study of the dynamics of various financial variables through the adjustment process and incorporate data through 2003. The characterization can be summarized as follows. We verify that the main results from Freund (2000) still hold: countries tend to experience slow GDP growth and a real depreciation as the cur-rent account adjusts, and the adjustment appears to be spurred by real export growth as well as declining investment and consumption. Current account adjustments are generally matched by reversals in the financial account. In emerging markets, all types of portfolio investment flows-debt, equity, and banking-adjust sharply (Rothenberg and Warnock 2005) , but in our sample of industrial countries, the financial account dynamics are more subtle. The most dramatic adjustment is in the banking or other flows, which decrease over 2 percentage points (of GDP) in the first two years of the adjustment. In addition, bond inflows appear to surge in the run-up to the reversal. In contrast, equity and direct investment flows do not show well-defined dynamics around the adjustment process.
Our results on the relationship between preconditions and outcomes can be summed up as follows. We find that larger deficits take longer to resolve and are associated with relatively slower income growth during recovery. There is no significant correlation between the size of the deficit and the extent of depreciation. In contrast, reversals that were preceded by a persistent deficit (a deficit that lasted for at least five years before reversing) are not associated with more depreciation or slower growth. We find that consumption and government-driven deficits tend to lead to a greater real depreciation than investment driven episodes: a 1 percentage point shift from investment to consumption (or government spending) generates an additional 0.7 percentage points in average annual depreciation during adjustment. We find relatively little evidence that the level of openness or the nature of the financing-whether it is through bond flows or more directly into productive uses, such as equity or direct investment-impact the severity of the adjustment. Deficits associated with greater bond inflows do appear to be followed by larger increases in interest rates-perhaps because the bond inflows kept interest rates abnormally low, as in Warnock and Warnock (2005) -and a sharper decrease in equity prices. Finally, the size of the external position does not appear to affect the outcome.
We also examine the 1987 U.S. adjustment episode to discern to what extent it reflected the typical case and look at the key indicators for 2004 in order to gauge where the United States stands with respect to adjustment. We find that in the 1987 episode, the extent of depreciation was very close to predicted, though adjustment was somewhat slower with less of a decrease in growth. We use 2004 values of key variables to predict the pattern of U.S. adjustment were it to begin now. The analysis suggests that were the adjustment to start in 2005, the dollar would depreciate 25 percent from its peak but only 2 1 ⁄4 percent annually over the next three years, as much of the depreciation occurs before the current account actually reverses.
Our work is complementary to many contemporaneous papers. The most similar in spirit is Croke, Kamin, and Leduc (2005) , who employ a similar data set to analyze how experiences differed between episodes characterized by a growth slowdown and those that were not, but they do not examine how preconditions in the episodes differed. Adelet and Eichengreen (chap. 6 in this volume) also use an event study approach with a much longer historical sample (going back to 1880) for a much broader range of countries; in their study, data limitations preclude analysis of the range of preconditions and outcomes that we are able to analyze. Clarida, Gorretti, and Taylor (chap. 5 in this volume), using empirical time series analysis, examine the points at which current accounts might reverse. Obstfeld and Rogoff (chap. 9 in this volume), in a general equilibrium model, start from the assumption that the current account adjusts and then trace out the implications. Faruqee et al. (chap. 10 in this volume) examine current account dynamics in the context of the IMF's global general equilibrium model.
Our work is also related to the literature on current account reversals in emerging markets (sometimes referred to as the sudden-stop literature). But reversals in our industrial country study are distinctly different from those in emerging markets. For example, whereas we find that reversals are associated with adjustments in either growth or the exchange rate, emerging market reversals are not associated with large changes in growth Chinn and Prasad 2003) , perhaps because the exchange rate adjusts much more.
2 On the financial side, our industrial country results differ from those for emerging markets for two reasons. One, financial systems in industrial countries are likely more efficient intermediating funds, making the type of capital flows associated with the run-up to a reversal less important. Two, the foreign debt of industrial countries is more likely to be denominated in the home currency, ameliorating the balance sheet effect of a devaluation.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 defines episodes of adjustment, examines empirical regularities of current account and financial account adjustment in industrial countries, and discusses persistent deficits. Section 4.3 examines whether case studies support the notion that bigger deficits (in terms of size, consumption, and debt flows) imply harder falls. Section 4.4 presents robustness analyses of the key results. Section 4.5 discusses the United States in light of the predictions. Section 4.6 concludes.
Characterizations of Episodes of Adjustment and Persistent Deficits
In this section, we define and characterize current account reversals and persistent deficits.
Episodes of Adjustment
We update previous results from Freund (2000) using data through 2003 and also incorporate financial variables. We document current account ad-justment from a large deficit to highlight patterns of adjustment. The following are criteria for a current account adjustment:
1. The current account deficit-GDP ratio exceeded 2 percent before the reversal.
2. The average deficit-GDP ratio was reduced by at least 2 percentage points over three years (from the minimum to the centered three-year average).
3. The maximum deficit-GDP ratio in the five years after the reversal was not larger than the minimum in the three years before the reversal.
4. The current account deficit-GDP ratio was reduced by at least onethird.
Using these criteria on data from high-income Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries from 1980 to 2003, we identify 26 episodes of adjustment, listed in table 4.1. In our sample, there is considerable variation across episodes, as current account troughs occurred between 1980 (Austria and Sweden) and 1999 (Austria, again, and New Zealand); ranged from relatively small deficits (2.1 percent in France) to some that were quite large (Portugal's 16.1 percent deficit); and were associated with a wide variety in the size of net foreign asset positions (from those that were nearly balanced or even positive, to one that exceeded negative 70 percent of GDP).
3 Figure 4 .1 documents the pattern of adjustment across a range of variables, with event time 0 corresponding to the year the current account balance is most negative. Consistent with previous studies, countries tend to experience slow GDP growth (and increasing unemployment) and a real depreciation as the current account adjusts. In addition, real export growth, as well as declining investment and consumption, spurs adjustment. Adjustments are associated with worsening budget deficits and a pause in the accumulation of reserves, but little change in real long-or short-term interest rates.
We next examine financial account dynamics through the adjustment period. Absent large shifts in errors and omissions or sharp movements in the capital account (which, for most countries, is too small to adjust much), current account adjustments must be matched by reversals in the financial account, but for industrial countries we know little about which components of the financial account actually adjust. As Rothenberg and Warnock (2005) show that net amounts can mask considerable differences in inflows and outflows, figure 4.2 is designed to show, for each of the four main components of the financial account (direct investment, Current Account Deficits in Industrial Countries 137 equity flows, bond flows, and banking or other flows), the adjustment process for net inflows (inflows minus outflows), gross outflows, and gross inflows.
In emerging markets, all types of portfolio investment inflows dry up around the time of the current account reversal (Rothenberg and Warnock 2005) . In sharp contrast, in our industrial country sample, the bulk of the adjustment in the year immediately following the current account trough comes via a sharp decrease in banking (or other) flows. In contrast, net direct investment, equity, and bond flows do not show clearly defined dynamics around the adjustment. The gross flows (depicted in the second and third columns of figure 4.2) do not provide much additional insight: the only new information that we can glean from the gross flows is that bond inflows typically surge in the run-up to the reversal and peak one to two years into the adjustment process.
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Persistent Deficits
In addition to reversals, we characterize persistent deficits because much of the concern over the current U.S. episode has focused on its extended duration. Persistence is also related to the net foreign asset position (NFA; which we also consider in the following), as persistent deficits will tend to decrease the NFA position. 4 Still, we think it is useful to have a separate variable that focuses entirely on duration in order to characterize these episodes and also to examine whether reversals from persistent deficits are inherently different. In addition, NFA position data are only available for twenty-four of the twenty-six episodes.
We define deficits as persistent if they satisfy the following three criteria:
1. The current account (CA)-GDP ratio was below 2 percent for five consecutive years.
2. There was no reversal (as defined in the preceding for five years). 3. The CA-GDP ratio was below two-thirds of its initial level in each of the five years.
The first criterion ensures that we are examining persistent deficits. The second ensures that the deficit is not undergoing a reversal; this criterion effectively eliminates V-shaped deficits. The third eliminates slow improvements and highly variable deficits. In all, the criteria leave us with two types of persistent deficits, those that are continuously worsening and those that are flat but deep.
We identify fourteen episodes of persistent deficits ( 3. The first column shows values for persistent-episode countries during the episode, the second column is for the same group outside of the episode, and the final column is for all other industrial countries. By definition, the current account position is, on average, worse. Key characteristics include lower-than-average savings rates, high net foreign debt, and somewhat elevated short-term interest rates. They are also somewhat less open-though this measure is highly variable and does not account for country size. 6 In contrast, investment-to-GDP and income growth are nearly identical to overall averages in the OECD. This suggests that persistent deficits are structural and that foreign investment is largely driven by opportunities that would remain unexploited in a world where capital was immobile.
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Are Some Reversals More Equal Than Others?
In this section, we evaluate whether large deficits, deficits that persist for at least five years, or deficits in countries with large foreign debt tend to involve more severe reversals.
7 To do so, we examine correlations between various outcomes (income growth, the extent of depreciation, the completeness with which adjustment occurred, and movements in interest rates and equity prices) with various preconditions (the size of the current account trough; whether the reversal was preceded by a persistent deficit; the extent to which it was associated with surges in consumption, investment, or fiscal deficits; the extent of openness and indebtedness to the rest of the world; and the nature of its financing). We use three measures of depreciation: the total real exchange rate adjustment during the seven years of the episode, the existence of an exchange rate crisis in that period, and the average exchange rate adjustment from year 0 to year 3. Exchange rate crises are identified using the Frankel and Rose (1996) definition, using monthly data on the local currency-special drawing rights (SDR) nominal exchange rate. 8 We use two measures of growth: average growth in the three years of recovery less average growth over the whole period and average growth in Current Account Deficits in Industrial Countries 143 Notes: Averages for all persistent episodes, including unresolved episodes. All others includes other countries and same currents during periods that do not qualify as persistent.
7. The IMF (2002) examines large deficits, defined as 4 percent of GDP or more that persist for at least three years, in addition to the definition of reversals from Freund (2000) . They also find that current account improvement increases as the size of the deficit increases, but less than one for one. Their focus is, however, on general characteristics of reversals, as opposed to differences between episodes with large and small deficits. The definition is different from that of general reversals so does not provide a direct comparison between episodes with large deficits and more moderate deficits.
8. A currency crisis has taken place if the nominal exchange rate depreciated by at least 25 percent over the last year and by at least 10 percent more than in the previous year. the three years of recovery less average growth in the three years before recovery. Asset price movements are captured by the change in short-term rates, long-term rates, and equity prices (all adjusted for inflation) from three years leading into the current account trough to the three years following. Finally, we characterize deficits by the extent to which they were resolved after three years. Specifically, the variable RESOLVE is defined as the percentage point improvement in the current account GDP ratio from year 0 to year 3. The definition of current account reversals implies that RESOLVE will be correlated with the size of the deficit: to qualify as a reversal, a significant improvement in the current account must occur. Still, this variable allows us to test whether other factors are correlated with adjustment and also the extent to which the average deficit is improved. That is, a coefficient on CA/GDP at trough of -1 would imply that deficits are fully reversed after three years. A coefficient of -.5 would imply they are 50 percent reversed. Simple correlations and significance levels are presented in table 4.4. A data appendix offers more details about the variables.
Large and Persistent Deficits
As noted in the introduction, current thinking suggests that large and persistent deficits will involve more pain. However, the correlations presented in table 4.4 imply that the resolution of large or persistent deficits does not require a more extensive depreciation nor are they more likely to be associated with an exchange rate crisis. If anything, the correlations indicate that large and persistent deficits tend to involve less depreciation than average. (We discuss this result in more detail in the next section.) The resolution of large deficits is, however, associated with a growth slowdown that is deeper than average (table 4.4 and figure 4.3). Not surprisingly, they also involve a significantly greater adjustment in a three-year period. There is no indication that deeper or more persistent deficits are associated with larger adjustments in interest rates or equity prices.
Consumption-versus Investment-versus Government-Driven Episodes
If current account deficits are associated with consumption booms or large fiscal deficits, rather than a surge in the more productive investment spending, the adjustment process might be more painful. Indeed, the correlations in table 4.4 imply that deficits driven by consumption growth involve significantly more depreciation in years 0 to 3. Similarly, deterioration in the fiscal balance increases depreciation, though the coefficient is not significant at standard levels. Consumption driven deficits are also associated with an increase in relative GDP growth 3year/3year. However, further examination shows that this is due to lower growth during the period when the deficit is worsening, as opposed to higher growth in the recovery period; consistent with this, the correlation between consumption 
Notes:
At most twenty-six observations. P-values are in parentheses. Year 0 is the year of the current account (CA) trough. Interest rates and equity prices are adjusted for inflation. In the outcome variables (in the first column), changes are generally expressed as the difference between the three-year average following the trough and the threeyear average leading up to the trough. Exceptions are GDP growth (lr avg), which is relative to the long-run average GDP growth, and average ER, which is average annual exchange rate movement from the trough to year 3. Total ER is the maximum total exchange rate depreciation from year -3 to year 3. In both cases, a currency depreciation will have a negative sign. Crisis is the presence of an exchange rate crisis at some point between year -3 and 3. Resolve is computed as the percent point improvement in the exchange rate from year 0 to year 3. NFA (net foreign asset), gross liabilities, and the shares of bond and DI/Equity flows are defined in the data appendix. * Significant at the 10 percent level or better.
growth in the preperiod and GDP growth relative to the long-run average is insignificant. Deficits driven by investment growth are associated with significantly slower income growth during recovery and significantly less depreciation than other episodes. These are likely the episodes that are most cyclical. The relationship between investment and the exchange rate adjustment is very strong (figure 4.4A). Interest rates and equity prices do not appear to be influenced by whether the current account deficit is associated with surges in consumption, investment, or budget deficits. Finally, we find no evidence that the growth in the fiscal balance affects GDP growth relative to long-run average.
Openness
In well-integrated economies, only a small relative price change will be needed to induce consumers to switch to domestic goods, thus reducing the trade (and current account) deficit. Thus, we expect that more open economies will experience less depreciation during adjustment. Looking at the correlation between openness (measured as average openness during the three years before reversal) and exchange rate adjustment, we find very little evidence that openness affects exchange rate adjustment in industrial countries. The signs are correct, greater openness is associated with less average and total depreciation and a lower likelihood of a crisis, but openness is not significant at standard levels.
Large Indebtedness to the Rest of the World
It can be argued that countries that rely heavily on foreign financing are more prone to quick reversals in foreign investment and that these quick reversals can induce considerable pain. For example, if foreigners hold a sizable portion of domestic assets (either in net or gross terms), their retreat could spark a spike in interest rates, decreasing equity prices, low growth, and a sharp depreciation.
To see whether this is true in our sample, we look at two measures of the extent of indebtedness to the rest of the world. The first is the size of the NFA position relative to GDP. Here we see no evidence that countries with large net debt positions (that is, negative NFA positions) have worse outcomes with respect to their exchange rates, income growth, interest rates, or equity prices. Counter to the evidence on exchange rate depreciation, there does appear to be a higher incidence of currency crises in countries with more negative NFA positions. The correlation with RESOLVE is negative, indicating that more negative NFA positions are (weakly) associated with greater improvements in the current account balance; however, the effect of the current account trough on adjustment turns out to be the only robustly significant factor. The second measure we utilize is the size of the country's gross liabilities to the rest of the world (scaled by GDP). Here the evidence is clear: larger gross liabilities positions do not appear to be associated with significantly worse outcomes.
While we do not find evidence that a more negative NFA or gross liabilities position results in worse outcomes, simple correlations can be misleading if they are affected by outliers. In figure 4 .5 we present scatter plots of the relationships between gross liabilities positions and GDP growth and currency movements. The figures show that, with or without outliers, there is no apparent relationship between the extent of foreign indebtedness at the time of the current account trough and subsequent changes in GDP or currency values.
9 If anything, larger gross liabilities positions are associated with less exchange rate depreciation.
Financing through Productive Means?
If the financial system does not intermediate very well, one could be concerned that large current account deficits financed by bond inflows are associated with borrowing binges that in the end bring more pain. In con-
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Caroline Freund and Frank Warnock 9. If foreign debt is largely foreign-currency denominated, as in many emerging markets (Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999; Burger and Warnock 2004) , the exchange rate depreciation associated with a current account reversal could lead to a painful balance-sheet effect. In our industrial country sample, this does not seem to be the case, trast, deficits financed by more productive inflows such as direct investment or equity inflows, because they went directly into productive uses, may well adjust in a more benign fashion. However, if the financial system is adept at intermediating, the form of the inflow should not matter; the system will find the best use for the funds, whether they enter the country as direct investment or short-term bond flows.
The evidence we present suggests the latter case. We find no evidence that the type of financing impacts the outcome for GDP growth or ex- 10 Deficits associated with larger bond inflows are associated with larger subsequent increases in short-term interest rates and a greater decrease in equity prices. This is consistent with the empirical evidence in Warnock and Warnock (2005) , who show that the cessation of large bond inflows can lead to a substantial increase in interest rates (which, presumably, could also lead to a sharper decrease in equity prices).
Multivariate Analysis
The simple correlations of table 4.4 indicated that larger deficits are associated with a greater slowdown in growth, less exchange rate depreciation, and a greater adjustment in CA/GDP. They also imply that the use of funds matter-deficits funding investment spending tend to be associated with slower growth during recovery and less depreciation. Of course, bilateral correlations leave open the possibility that other factors are driving these relationships. Parsing out effects in a sample of twenty-six observations is difficult, but in this section we attempt to determine whether these relationships are robust or if other factors are more important. Specifically, we regress GDP growth; percentage change in the exchange rate, that is, appreciation or depreciation (⌬ER); and the extent to which the current account deficit is resolved in three years on the preconditions: the size of the current account trough, whether it was preceded by a persistent deficit, the composition of spending variables, and (where relevant) openness and the NFA position. Table 4 .5 investigates the factors that result in larger growth slowdowns. The dependent variable is relative income growth relative to the long-run average; consistent with table 4.4, the size of the current account at its trough is highly significant (column [1] ).
Growth Effects
11 The coefficient on the size of the current account deficit at its trough is 0.15, implying that a 1 percentage point increase in the current account deficit at its trough is associated with a 0.15 percentage point slowdown in annual growth during the first three years of recovery. Including other factors-persistent deficits; the magnitude of the NFA position, or investment; consumption, and fiscal growth in the prerecovery period (columns [2] and [3])-does not materially impact the size or significance of the coefficient on CA/GDP, nor are these other factors significant. In column (4), we control for average growth in the period before the deficit reached its trough (lagged average growth); growth in the previous period is not significant. 12 Finally, in columns (5) and (6), we test whether the relationship between growth slowdown and the size of the deficit owes to a few large deficit countries. Excluding potential outliers (see figure 4. 3)-countries with deficits that exceeded 10 percent or, alternatively, those that exceeded 6 percent-does not materially reduce the magnitude of the coefficient on CA/GDP, although when only the three countries with extreme current account deficits are excluded, the coefficient is no longer significant.
The results in table 4.5 indicate that the relationship between the size of the current account deficit and the subsequent growth slowdown is rather robust. We caution, though, that while larger deficits are correlated with slower subsequent growth, this does not necessarily imply that larger deficits depress growth. It could be that the large deficit may be the result of a more amplified business cycle: strong growth exacerbates the deficit and the ensuing slowdown as the deficit narrows is more severe. However, as noted, even when we control for growth in the period when the deficit exCurrent Account Deficits in Industrial Countries 151 Notes: Dependent variable: GDP growth 0 to 3 relative to long-run average. Robust tstatistics are in parentheses. Column (5) excludes countries with deficits exceeding 10 percent of GDP. Column (6) excludes countries with deficits exceeding 6 percent of GDP. * * Significant at the 5 percent level.
panded, the size of the deficit is still highly significant (table 4.5, column [4] ). It could be that greater growth before the deficit reversed tends to generate larger deficits, but the correlation between prereversal income growth and CA/GDP at trough is close to zero and insignificant (not shown). Thus, stronger growth as the deficit worsened is not correlated with the size of the deficit, but weaker growth as the deficit improved is correlated with its size. 13 Finally, if business-cycle effects were the main driver of the episode, the correlation between GDP growth (3year/3year) should be highly correlated with the extent of adjustment, with deficits that show a larger resolution, experiencing a greater slowdown relative to the previous three years, and therefore a more extreme business cycle. However, the correlation between these variables is near zero and insignificant. In contrast, GDP growth relative to long-term GDP growth is correlated with the extent of adjustment ( figure 4.3) . Thus, while the business cycle clearly plays a role in these adjustments, it does not fully explain why larger deficits are associated with slower real income growth.
We note, too, that the correlations in table 4.4 suggest that the interest rate channel is absent: bigger deficits are not associated with bigger increases in interest rates or with interest rates that are high relative to longrun averages. Still, we find that larger deficits are associated with significantly lower investment during the current account recovery. 13. We also find that the size of the deficit at its trough is uncorrelated with movements in unemployment (not reported). records results when we decompose the growth effects. Specifically, we regress investment growth (year 0 to 3) on lagged investment growth (year -3 to 0) and the current account trough to see if there is evidence of strong investment growth that reverses (column [1]). Prereversal investment growth is insignificant, while the current account trough remains highly significant, with a coefficient of 0.5. The correlation is highly significant even when we exclude outliers (columns [2] and [3] ). Thus, we cannot rule out a depressing effect of the current account deficit on investment growth. This is consistent with previous work showing that much of the adjustment from a large current account deficit comes through investment (Freund 2000 (Freund , 2005 , and, of course, larger deficits require larger adjustments. In contrast, the effect of the current trough on other components of GDP growth is not robustly significant (columns [4]-[9] ). Cyclical effects with respect to consumption are very strong-countries that had a consumption boom as the current account deficit worsened tend to have a decline in consumption during the reversal. The size of the deficit is correlated with consumption when outliers are excluded, but the sign implies that countries with larger deficits had, if anything, less of a decline in consumption. This implies that the welfare effects of large deficits may be limited, depending on the extent to which GDP declines during adjustment.
Exchange Rate Effects
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 report results when average exchange rate adjustment (from year 0 to year 3) and total exchange rate adjustment are the dependent variables, respectively. For average exchange rate adjustment, a number of the variables displayed a significant correlation (table 4.4). When all of these variables are included in the regression, we find that there are robust effects from being preceded by a persistent episode and from the extent of investment growth before reversal (table 4.8). In particular, both the presence of a persistent deficit and the extent of investment growth before the reversal reduce the extent of depreciation that is required to accommodate adjustment. We also control for the exchange rate adjustment as the deficit worsened (column [3] ) and removing potential outliers (columns [4] and [5] ). The result is very strong and suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in investment as a share of GDP as the deficit is expanding leads nearly 1 percentage point less average annual depreciation during the current account recovery. In addition, the presence of a persistent deficit reduces average depreciation by about 3 percentage points annually. As shown in figure 4 .4, the correlation between investment growth in the preperiod and average exchange rate movement is very strong.
Investment growth in the period when the current account is worsening also reduces the extent of total depreciation (table 4.8). In particular, a 1 percentage point increase in investment is associated with a total depreciation that is about 2.5 percentage points smaller. The result is robust to controlling for the total exchange rate adjustment in the period before the exchange rate reversed (column [2]), to including other variables (columns [3] and [4]), and to removing outliers (columns [5] and [6] ). If we regress total exchange rate adjustment on a constant alone, the coefficient is -16.3 (not reported), implying that, on average, a total real depreciation of about 16 percent is required for adjustment.
In both specifications, we can reject that the coefficients on consumption growth and fiscal deterioration are equal to the coefficient on investment growth. We cannot reject that consumption and fiscal deterioration have the same effect on exchange rate movements. This implies that deficits driven by consumption or fiscal deterioration are associated with significantly more depreciation than those driven by investment.
When total exchange rate adjustment is the dependent variable, the presence of a persistent deficit is not statistically significant (column [4]) though the sign still implies that persistent deficit countries experience less depreciation. The somewhat contradictory results on persistent deficits with respect to average and total exchange rate adjustment imply that being preceded by a persistent deficit does not affect total depreciation but does affect depreciation in the recovery period. In the persistent episodes, depreciation begins somewhat earlier, with stronger j-curve effects. We do not find strong evidence that openness affects the extent of depreciation that accompanies reversals.
14 When average exchange rate adjustment is the dependent variable, the coefficient is close to zero and insignificant. When total exchange rate adjustment is the dependent Current Account Deficits in Industrial Countries 155 Notes: Dependent variable: total real exchange rate adjustment. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. P-values are in brackets. Columns (5) and (6) exclude countries with current account (CA) GDP rations less than -10 and -6, respectively. * * Significant at the 5 percent level.
variable, the coefficient has the expected sign: greater openness reduces depreciation, but it is not significant. It could be that the trade-GDP ratio is a bad measure of the extent of openness at the margin. Alternatively, the small sample size could be an issue. 15 In addition, countries now in the European Union make more than half of the sample and may have similar levels of integration. Finally, overall openness may not be what is relevant, but rather the price elasticity of imports and exports and their various components (Mann and Plück, chap. 7 in this volume). Table 4 .9 reports results on adjustment effects. Only the size of the deficit matters for the extent to which it is resolved after three years. We find that for each 1 percentage point increase in the current account trough, three years into recovery, the current account is about .5 percentage points larger. The coefficient on CA/GDP at trough is significantly different from
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15. If we exclude Belgium, with an openness measure exceeding 120 percent, the coefficient on openness is highly significant, provided only investment growth (year -3 to 0) and openness are included in the regression. negative one (except when we exclude deficits exceeding 6 percent of GDP), indicating that larger deficits remain significantly larger after 3 years. Thus, large deficits are not as completely resolved as small ones after three years.
Summary of Results
The results show that larger deficits are associated with slower income growth during the current account recovery period and take somewhat longer to resolve. Growth effects are more severe because more adjustment is required when the current account deficit is greater. Indeed, as we have shown, growth (relative to long run) is negatively correlated with the extent of adjustment ( figure 4.3) . Although deeper deficits are associated with slower growth, they do not appear to require more depreciation. Once we control for other variables, exchange rate movements are not significantly different in countries with deeper deficits. In part, this may be because nominal exchange rate adjustment is limited in some industrial countries, either because of managed systems, fixed exchange rates, or because key trading partners fix exchange rates. Restricted exchange rate adjustment in turn leads to more extreme current account deficits and lower income growth during current account recovery. Income growth is forced to accommodate adjustment precisely because depreciation is not more severe. Indeed, there is a strong inverse correlation between the extent of exchange rate adjustment and the slowdown in GDP growth (figure 4.4B). There is a tradeoff: adjustment comes through either exchange movements or GDP growth. If exchange rates movements are limited, the current account position worsens further, and the GDP hit is more extreme.
We also found that the resolution of persistent deficits and of deficits with large negative NFA positions is broadly similar to others, in terms of total exchange rate adjustment and growth effects. Investment-driven current accounts require less exchange rate adjustment than episodes driven by consumption or government spending. This implies that investment channels resources into exports that can eventually service the debt. Finally, we found that financing does not matter significantly for the adjustment process, suggesting that markets are efficient at intermediating funds.
Implications for the United States
In 1987, the U.S. deficit was driven largely by consumption-from 1984 to 1987 consumption grew 2.5 percentage points, while investment declined by 2 percentage points. Table 4 .10 reports predictions, based on the significant variables in the preceding regressions, and actual effects. It also reports predictions that are based on the assumption that the U.S. current account deficit begins its reversal this year; that is, predictions that use 2004 values of the initial conditions for the United States. For the 1987 episode, the model performs reasonably well on exchange rate adjustment-total depreciation was somewhat higher than predicted, and average depreciation during the recovery was right on target. The model predicted slower growth and a larger adjustment than actually occurred.
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Despite the large current account deficit, the model predicts roughly the same total depreciation now and less depreciation from year 0 to year 3. The reason is that investment growth has been somewhat stronger and it is a persistent deficit, and persistent deficits tend to involve less depreciation during recovery. Of course, most of these bilateral relationships are not at all tight, so wide (sometimes very wide) confidence intervals-most of which would encompass zero-must be placed around these point estimates.
Finally, a striking feature of figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 is that the United States is in no way an exception when placed with other current account reversal episodes. That is, the United States is typically found in the middle of the scatter plot and is never an outlier. There is, however, one aspect in which the United States is an outlier. ure. First, the fitted line is meaningless because the confidence band on the point estimate would be enormous, and the fitted line would not be downward sloping if we excluded the United States. Second, while the United States might look like an outlier on this graph, and perhaps to an economist, portfolio theory would suggest that the United States should have an even greater gross liabilities position. Because the United States is roughly half of global capital markets, simple portfolio theory would predict that U.S. liabilities should be roughly 50 percent of rest-of-the-world wealth, not the 37 percent we see today. While looking at previous episodes offers some useful insights into how a U.S. adjustment might occur, there are several reasons to believe the United States is a special case. The main one is the size of the United States and, thus, the large capital inflows necessary to finance the deficit. In addition, currency management by trade partners, who would suffer from a sharp U.S. adjustment, has limited exchange rate movements. The status of the dollar as the reserve currency also has important implications for adjustment. Finally, the fact that debt is denominated in U.S. dollars makes depreciation less costly to domestic residents.
Conclusion
We have shown that large deficits are associated with a significant slowdown in income growth though, if anything, they involve less depreciation. We think these facts are related. In countries where exchange movements are limited, either because of managed systems, fixed exchange rates, or key partners fix exchange rates, the current account will deteriorate more than if the exchange rate were flexible. Moreover, because of restricted exchange adjustment, growth will be forced to do much of the work of adjustment. Indeed, there is a very robust inverse correlation between income growth and the total exchange rate adjustment during the recovery. In contrast, persistent deficits do not lead to a more severe adjustment. Our results suggest that they may be slightly less disruptive in terms of exchange rate movement, with depreciation beginning earlier in the episode and being somewhat more limited. In general, persistent-deficit countries are characterized by a low savings rate.
We also find that deficits driven by investment growth are more benign in terms of exchange rate adjustment than deficits driven by consumption or fiscal spending. This is intuitive as these are the economies where the accrued debt can be more easily serviced. There is only weak evidence that the level of openness reduces the magnitude of exchange adjustment.
On the financing side, we find that the nature of the inflows while the current account deficit is worsening does not impact the outcome. That is, whether the financing of the deficit comes through inflows of equity, direct investment, bonds, or bank deposits has no apparent bearing on the adjustment process, possibly because financial systems in industrial countries intermediate these flows rather well. Finally, the size of the foreign liabilities position seems to be uncorrelated with the adjustment process. ability, taking into account a number of other macroeconomic and financial indicators such as the level of saving and investment, the level of the real exchange rate, the burden of external liabilities, the size of short-term debt relative to reserves, and, more generally, financial-sector exposure and vulnerability. (See, e.g., Milesi-Ferretti and Razin 1996 , 2000 These studies are also related to the more formal literature on early warning indicators that attempt to predict currency crises.
In a similar vein, the present work by Freund and Warnock addresses key side effects of current account reversals in industrialized economies. They find that larger preexisting deficits take longer to adjust and are associated with significantly slower income growth (relative to trend) than smaller deficits during the current account improvement phase. They also find that consumption-driven current account deficits involve significantly larger depreciations than deficits that serve to finance investment spending. They also bring out interesting evidence that economies that run persistent deficits (and, therefore, have large net foreign debt positions) are accommodated by a more pronounced exchange rate adjustment, or slower growth, during the transition to a balanced current account position.
Methodology and Findings
Freund and Warnock characterize deficits by the extent to which they were resolved after three years. Specifically, the variable RESOLVE is defined as the percentage point improvement in the current account GDP ratio from year 0 to year 3. This variable allows them to test whether other factors are correlated with the current account adjustment and also the extent to which the average deficit is improved. That is, a coefficient on CA/ GDP at trough of -1 would imply that deficits are fully reversed after three years, whereas a coefficient of -.5 would imply they are 50 percent reversed. Their findings are as follows.
Growth Equation
The regression equation is
They find that only the coefficient a is significant.
Depreciation Equation
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They find that only the coefficients c and e are significant.
Resolution Equation
Consumption and Investment Growth Rates
The correlations in table 4.4 imply that deficits driven by consumption growth involve significantly more depreciation in years 0 to 3. Similarly, deterioration in the fiscal balance increases depreciation, though the coefficient is not significant at standard levels. Consumption driven deficits are also associated with an increase in relative GDP growth. Deficits driven by investment growth are associated with significantly slower income growth during recovery and significantly less depreciation than other episodes.
Large Indebtedness to the Rest of the World
Freund and Warnock find no evidence that countries with large net debt positions (that is, negative net foreign asset positions) have worse outcomes with respect to their exchange rates, income growth, interest rates, or equity prices. Contrary to the evidence on exchange rate depreciation, there does appear to be a higher incidence of currency crises in countries with more negative net foreign asset positions. The correlation with RESOLVE is negative, indicating that more negative NFA positions are (weakly) associated with greater improvements in the current account balance. The second measure they utilize is the size of the country's gross liabilities to the rest of the world (scaled by GDP). Here the evidence is clearer: larger gross liabilities positions do not appear to be associated with significantly worse outcomes.
A caveat in the analysis is that it does not address the issue of heterogeneity across countries, especially as regards policy credibility. What is at stake here is the possibility that self-selectivity be the main determinant in the regression: when the probability of current account deficit is high (the current account trough variable), the country's macroeconomic policy credibility is low. At the same time policy credibility affect the future resolution of the current account imbalance (the RESOLVE variable). Controlling for country fixed effects or including instrumented macropolicy variables are ways to address this self-selection issue.
Identifying Alternative Mechanisms
Freund and Warnock have essentially only a first-pass look at the analysis of current account reversals. They are not able to identify specific mechanisms that are underlying the current account adjustment process. Here is a list of key mechanisms behind current account adjustments.
Return Differentials across Assets and Liabilities Milesi-Ferretti (2004, 2005) and Gourinchas and Rey (chap. 1 in this volume) document that a given rate-of-return differential between assets and liabilities exerts a larger effect on the dynamics of the net position when the volume of gross external portfolios grows. This has been indeed the trend particularly during the past decade. The relative importance of direct investment and portfolio equity investment in international portfolios has increased, and those financial instruments have on average higher and more volatile returns than debt instruments.
Resource Transfer through Depreciation
Almost all of U.S. foreign liabilities are in dollars, where 70 percent of U.S. foreign assets are in foreign currencies. Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti and Phillip Lane (2004 calculate that between 2002 and 2004, more than 75 percent of the increase in America's net foreign indebtedness caused by the current account deficit was offset by changes in the value of external assets and liabilities as a result of the dollar's fall. Thus a big external deficit does not necessarily imply a commensurate rise in net indebtedness to foreigners.
Exchange Rate Regimes and Sudden Stops
The heterogeneity of exchange rate regimes in the sample used by Freund and Warnock has not been adequately exploited in their analysis. Financial crises theory suggests that the way expectations by market participants are coordinated may trigger a financial crisis in a situation characterized by a latent threshold state of the economy. A financial crisis occurs if the latent variable is below a certain threshold. Above the threshold, financial crises are avoided, and the economic performance is strong. The estimated probability of sudden stops proxies the latent threshold state variable. (See Razin and Rubinstein 2005.) There are good reasons to expect that the crisis threshold is also directly affected by the policy regime itself. For example, a peg is expected to lower the crisis threshold, and thus increase the crisis probability, for any given combination of countryspecific and world economy shocks. Likewise, capital market liberalization tends to raise the crisis probability. In other words, the adoption of a peg is expected to have a direct positive effect on growth, through the trade adjustment channel, and an indirect negative effect, through a crisisprobability channel. Similarly, the adoption of capital account liberalization is expected to have a direct positive effect on growth, through capital market efficiency channels, and an indirect negative effect, through a crisisprobability channel.
Debt Dollarization Razin and Rubinstein (2006) bring out evidence for the role of balance sheets in sudden-stop episodes. They use the ratio of the country's foreign currency liabilities to its money supply (FLM) as a proxy for the country's foreign currency exposure to fluctuations in the real exchange rate. Table  4C .1 provides estimates of the influence of a policy-regime switch on debt polarization. Column (1) indicates that the policy regimes (a switch to peg, and the imposition of capital controls) do not have a direct effect on polarization. Column (2) indicates a significant effect of the crisis probability, as a single explanatory variable, on polarization. Column (3) indicates that policy regimes do not directly affect polarization, but only indirectly affect polarization through the probability of sudden stops. Table 4C .2 demonstrates how debt polarization influences growth. Columns (1) and (2) of table 4C.2 indicate that the polarization measure (FLM) does not have direct influence on growth, once one controls for the actual realization of sudden stop crises. A crisis, as expected, reduces growth in a significant way. In column (3) of table 4C.2, the interaction between polarization and the realized sudden stops is added. The coefficient of the interaction term is negative and highly significant. This means that although polarization does not have an independent influence on growth, the interaction between polarization and sudden stops tends to reduce the growth rate drastically.
